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Introduction
This brief note has two purposes. First, we seek to avoid misunderstand-
ings about the position we take after the appearance of the two extensive
comments on our recent essay concerning the efficient component-pricing rule
in this Journal.' To summarize, we are in essential agreement with the
comments of Professor Alfred Kahn and Dr. William Taylor,2 while, as is
tDirector, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University; Professor Emeritus,
Princeton University.
ttResident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research; Senior Lecturer,
Yale School of Management.
1. William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors, 11 YALE
J. ON REG. 171 (1994).
2. Alfred E. Kahn & William E. Taylor, 7he Pricing ofinputs Sold to Competitors: A Comment,
11 YALE J. ON REG. 225 (1994).
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hardly surprising, we are totally unconvinced by Dr. William Tye's discus-
sion.3
Our second, and larger, purpose is to report on the recent decision of the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the House of Lords that embraced
our efficient component-pricing rule as a principle consistent with New Zea-
land antitrust law. The ruling emerged from a proceeding concerning the
permissible price that the incumbent Telecom Corporation of New Zealand
may charge the entrant Clear Communications for access to its local telephone
network.
We conclude with some remarks about the likelihood that other courts and
regulators, particularly those in the United States, will adopt the efficient
component-pricing rule.
I. Rejoinder
The paper contributed by Professor Kahn and Dr. Taylor is clearly
intended as an extension and clarification of our theme, and as such we can
only welcome it. The authors do criticize us, with some justification, for
having insufficiently qualified our exposition. In particular, they agree that the
efficient component-pricing rule will do what we claim, and provide (to reuse
the much overemployed phrase) a "level playing field" in an industry in which
the incumbent holds a bottleneck input that must also be used by its competitor.
Yet they note that, by itself, the rule, which requires a bottleneck input to be
supplied at its incremental (marginal) cost, including its incremental (marginal)
opportunity cost, if imposed without supplementary safeguards, requires the
lessor of the bottleneck facilities to include in the rental payment whatever
monopoly profits the bottleneck proprietor has been able to extract from other
customers.
This reservation is entirely correct. In our recent book on local telephone
regulation we have been most explicit about this concern, emphasizing the
second economic efficiency requirement that, in addition to the efficient
component-pricing rule, final product prices must be constrained by market
forces or regulation so as to preclude monopoly profits.4 We have explicitly
emphasized that the one rule, without the other, does not guarantee results that
serve the public interest. If such points were inadequately emphasized in our
Essay, we can only express our regrets.
Dr. Tye uses the forum provided by this Journal not really to discuss our
essay, but to revisit old differences stemming from when he and one of us
3. William B. Tye, The Pricing ofInputs Sold to Competitors: A Response, 11 YALE J. ON REG.
203 (1994).
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previously appeared on opposite sides before various regulatory agencies.
Thus, a good portion of Dr. Tye's paper takes Baumol to task for having
argued elsewhere that voluntary negotiation was likely to result in acceptance
of rental fees consistent with the efficient component-pricing rule.5 Since
voluntary negotiations were not even mentioned in our essay and because they
have no relevance to the subject matter at hand, these remarks by Dr. Tye are
entirely beside the point-an ineffective attempt to settle irrelevant scores.
A second major topic of Dr. Tye's piece is his criticism that we simply
propose a regulatory rule for the pricing of bottleneck inputs, and do not even
consider a competitive solution as an alternative.6 That is true, so far as it
goes. However, that is only because we have elsewhere already strongly
expressed our preference for true competition, as against regulation, as the best
means to ensure that business behavior promotes the public interest. We simply
did not consider the competitive option to be part of the subject of our essay.
Rather, that essay sought to answer the question, if faute de mieux, we happen
in some circumstances to have no viable alternative to regulation, what does
economic efficiency require the regulator to do about the prices of bottleneck
inputs? It surely would have been nonsense for us to answer, "The regulator
should turn to competition, even in circumstances where competition does not
work."
But there is more to the matter. Dr. Tye, presumably without recognizing
it, has often argued for promotion of what he considers to be competition by
means of subsidies provided by the bottleneck proprietor to the competitor
making use of the bottleneck facility. But this would just ensure the sort of
pseudo-competition that is obtainable by tilting the playing field in favor of the
bottleneck service buyer, and bringing business to that firm even when it is
the less efficient provider. This result surely is but a caricature of true
competition and hardly the way to promote economic efficiency.
The bottom line is this: it is easy to prove, as we have already done so
in our essay and elsewhere, that the efficient component-pricing rule is a
necessary condition for price to permit economic efficiency. There we leave
the matter to rest.
II. Epilogue: The Privy Council's Endorsement of the Efficient Component-
Pricing Rule
Several months after this Journal published its series of three essays on
the efficient component-pricing rule, the highest court in the British Common-
wealth embraced the rule, citing two of the essays. The Privy Council of the
5. Tye, supra note 3, at 203.
6. Id. at 203.
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House of Lords held in Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited v. Clear
Communications Limited that the efficient component-pricing rule is compati-
ble with New Zealand antitrust principles governing the pricing of inputs sold
to competitors.'
As we explained in our essay,9 New Zealand had precipitated by 1991
the first modern litigation over the pricing of interconnection among rival local
telephone companies as a result of its policies promoting competition in
telecommunications. New Zealand's lower court, known as the High Court,
ruled that the incumbent local exchange carrier, Telecom, did not abuse a
dominant position in the market in violation of New Zealand's antitrust statute,
section 36 of the Commerce Act" when Telecom demanded that the entrant,
Clear, pay an interconnection price derived from the efficient component-
pricing rule. New Zealand's Court of Appeal, however, reversed on the
grounds that it would violate section 36 for Telecom to include its foregone
monopoly profit in the opportunity-cost component of the access charge paid
by Clear under the efficient component-pricing rule.12 Telecom appealed that
decision (and Clear cross-appealed other aspects of the decision not discussed
here) to the Privy Council of the House of Lords in London.
On October 19, 1994, the Privy Council reversed in relevant part the
decision of the Court of Appeal. Writing for their Lordships, Lord Browne-
Wilkinson considered the efficient component-pricing rule to have the
following relevance to interpreting section 36's concept of "use of a dominant
position":
As to what constitutes "use of a dominant position", although their
Lordships agree with Gault J. [of the Court of Appeal] that ultimately
the question depends upon the true effect of the statutory words used
in section 36 and not on any economic model, the statutory words
provide no explanation as to the distinction between conduct which
does, and conduct which does not, constitute such use. Both the High
Court and the Court of Appeal proceeded on the basis, with which
their Lordships agree, that if the terms Telecom were seeking to
7. No. 21-94 (P.C. Oct. 19, 1994).
8. Id. at 23-24 (citing Baumol & Sidak, supra note 1; Kahn & Taylor, supra note 2).
9. Baumol & Sidak, supra note 1, at 190-95.
10. Commerce Act, 1986, No. 5, § 36, 1986 N.Z. Stat. 71, 95. Section 36(1) states: "No person
who has a dominant position in a market shall use that position for the purpose of (a) Restricting the
entry of any person into that or any other market; or (b) Preventing or deterring any person from
engaging in competitive conduct in that or in any other market; or (c) Eliminating any person from that
or any other market." Id.
11. Clear Communications, Ltd. v. Telecom Corp. of New Zealand, CP590/91 (H.C. Dec. 22,
1992), rev'd C.A. 25-93 (C.A. Dec. 17, 1993), rev'd No. 21-94 (P.C., Oct. 19, 1994).
12. Clear Communications, Ltd. v. Telecom Corp. of New Zealand, C.A. 25-93 (C.A. Dec. 17,
1993), rev'd No. 21-94 (Oct. 19, 1994).
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extract were no higher than those which a hypothetical firm would
seek in a perfectly contestable market, Telecom was not using its
dominant position. In order to discover what such hypothetical terms
might be it is inevitable that the parties and the court must have
recourse to expert economic advice. The Baumol-Willig Rule is a
closely reasoned economic model which seeks to show how the
hypothetical firm would conduct itself. 3
The Privy Council then considered whether the efficient component-pricing
rule would violate section 36 by allowing Tefecom to recover monopoly rents
in the opportunity-cost component of the access price that it proposed to charge
Clear.
Their Lordships emphasized that courts applying section 36 "are not acting
as regulators" and that "section 36 is only one of the remedies provided by
the Commerce Act for the purpose of combatting over-pricing due to
monopolistic behavior." 4 Other sections of the Commerce Act, Lord
Browne-Wilkinson observed, are available to perform this role:
Part IV [of the Commerce Act] deals separately with control of
prices. Under section 53 the Governor-General, on the recom-
mendation of the Minister, may declare that the prices for goods or
services of any description supplied to or for the use of different
persons are controlled. Under section 53(2)(a) a Minister cannot
make such a recommendation unless he is satisfied the goods or
services are supplied in a market "in which competition is limited
or is likely to be lessened." Under section 70 the Commission may
authorise a price to be charged for controlled services. Therefore
section 36 is only part of an overall statutory machinery for dealing
with trade practices which operate to the detriment of consumers.
Another part of such machinery (Part IV) is specifically directed to
the regulation of prices in markets which are not fully competitive.15
In our previous essay, we may have been taken to suggest that the Commerce
Act provides no power to regulate prices. More precisely, we should have
noted that such price regulation, while possible, was not in effect during the
interconnection litigation between Telecom and Clear.
13. Slip op. at 21, Privy Council Appeal No. 21 of 1994 (Oct. 19, 1994, Judgment of the Lords
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council). The "Baumol-Wilig Rule" is another name given the
efficient component-pricing rule because it was presented in the New Zealand litigation in the testimony
of Professor Robert D. Willig and one of the present authors.
14. Id. at 22.
15. Id.
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Perhaps as a consequence of our exiguous summary of New Zealand law
on price regulation, counsel for Clear argued to the Privy Council that-as
their Lordships restated the argument-our previous essay "amounted to a
recantation by Professor Baumol . . . of the evidence [he] gave in this
case. " 16 The controversy centered on two passages from the essay in which
we discussed the possible persistence of monopoly rents in the efficient
component price if no regulation existed to constrain monopoly pricing by
Telecom. Quoting our Essay at length, Lord Browne-Wilkinson wrote:
Professor Baumol after referring to the judgment of the Court of
Appeal in the present case said (at page 195):
"Given these circumstances, we must sympathize with the
reasoning of the Court of Appeal. As we explain
elsewhere, the efficient component-pricing rule plays its
full beneficial role only when adopted as part of a set of
complementary rules designed to promote consumer
welfare. One such rule is that a monopolist should not be
permitted to charge a price for a final product sold to
consumers that is higher than the price that would attract
an efficient entrant into the market-a price equal to the
stand-alone cost of producing that final product. But, as
Justice Cooke [of the High Court] noted, no such price
ceiling exists under the current laws and regulations of
New Zealand. It is therefore understandable that the Court
of Appeal ordered Clear and Telecom to renew
negotiations to set an access price that excluded any
monopoly profit foregone by Telecom."
Later, after referring to the possible perpetuation of monopoly rents
if opportunity costs are charged to an entrant, Professor Baumol said
(at page 196):
"All this is true, but the villain is not the efficient compo-
nent-pricing rule. The real problem is that the landlord
has been permitted to charge monopoly prices for the
final product in the first place. Had the ceiling upon final-
product prices been based on stand-alone cost, which as
we explain elsewhere it should be, the landlord could
never have earned a monopoly profit in this regulatory
16. Id. at 23 (citing Baumol & Sidak, supra note 1).
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scenario. The error, therefore, is the failure to impose the
stand-alone cost ceiling on the final-product price, not the
use of the efficient component-pricing rule. ""
The Privy Council recognized that, contrary to the assertion of Clear's counsel,
our discussion of the Court of Appeal's ruling was entirely consistent with
Baumol's original testimony to the High Court. With respect to the preceding
statements contained in our essay, Lord Browne-Wilkinson wrote:
In their Lordships' view, the statements by Professor Baumol
are not a recantation by him of his evidence given in this case.
Throughout, he has accepted that the Rule will initially perpetuate
monopoly rents until either (a) they are competed out by Clear's
competition in the contested area or (b) they are removed by
regulatory action. He is not apparently aware that Part IV of the
Commerce Act does in fact provide for a regulatory machinery which
could be, but has not been, brought into operation.'"
The Privy Council similarly saw no inconsistency between Professor Kahn's
testimony to the High Court and his subsequent essay in this Journal with Dr.
Taylor. 9 Their Lordships found "nothing in these articles which alters the
substance of the evidence considered by the High Court and the Court of
Appeal. "' "The principal question remains, as it always was," wrote Lord
Browne-Wilkinson, "whether the actual or potential presence of monopoly
rents vitiates the validity of the Baumol-Willig model for the purposes of
section 36. "2
The Privy Council answered that question in the negative. Lord Browne-
Wilkinson wrote that "the risk of monopoly rents has no bearing upon the
question whether the application of the Baumol-Willig Rule prevents
competition in the contested area. "' "If both Telecom and Clear are charging
their customers the same amount in the area in which they are not
competitors," their Lordships reasoned, "this does not have any effect on their
relative competitiveness in the area in which they compete."" The Privy
17. Id. (citing Baumol & Sidak, supra note 1, at 195, 196).
18. Id.
19. "Dr. Kahn also accepted throughout his evidence that, in the absence of regulatory control,
his theory of competitive parity led to the possible continuance of monopoly rents. In the second article
[on the efficient component-pricing rule] (at page 231-2) he persists in that view, although he too is
under the misapprehension that no machinery exists in New Zealand to regulate the prices charged by
Telecom to Clear." Id. at 24.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 27.
23. Id.
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Council stated that "the underlying object of section 36 will be achieved if the
Rule is applied. "24
The Privy Council thus concluded that the Court of Appeal had erred
when it "took the view that section 36 had the wider purpose, beyond
producing fair competition, of eliminating monopoly profits currently obtained
by the person in the dominant market position."' Part IV of the Commerce
Act already authorized the government to impose explicit price regulation. It
would misconstrue section 36, their Lordships concluded, "to extend its scope
to produce a quasi-regulatory system which the Act expressly provides for,
with all the necessary powers and safeguards, in another part of the Act. "26
"The consequences of so doing could be unjust and would be
impracticable."27 Moreover, their Lordships seemed to consider it beyond
the authority and competence of a court to undertake, in the absence of explicit
legislation, the regulation of reasonable prices:
If, as their Lordships consider, on the true construction of the
Commerce Act, section 36 does not operate to exclude Telecom from
initially charging monopoly rents (if any) and the elimination of such
monopoly rents is (otherwise than by competition) within the
province of Part IV of the Act, it is irrelevant to the court's function
to take into account Government policy. The Government can either
adopt the policy of leaving Clear's competition to compete out
Telecom's monopoly rents (if any) or activate the Part IV machinery
which is available .... But what policy the Government adopts is
no concern of the courts. 28
Having so construed section 36 and the appropriate judicial function in
resolving interconnection disputes, the Privy Council concluded that "the final
position adopted by Telecom at trial based on the Baumol-Willig Rule did not
breach section 36 since it did not involve the use by Telecom of its dominant
position."29
The Privy Council's decision also suggests how Telecom, despite its
ostensible freedom from price regulation, may be subjected to what could be
termed "virtual regulation." After noting that "at the end the of argument
before their Lordships, the parties indicated that their negotiating positions are
coming close together," Lord Browne-Wilkinson wrote that "Telecom accepts
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 28.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 29.
29. Id.
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that it should not seek to recover any element of monopoly rents from Clear
since, if necessary, such monopoly rents could be stripped out by the activation
of Part IV of the Commerce Act."30 Thus, the mere threat that the
government may begin to regulate the price of the vertically integrated
monopolist's final product may suffice to excise some or all of its monopoly
rents from the opportunity-cost portion of the efficient component price. Stated
differently, the incumbent's expected opportunity cost of providing
interconnection to a competitor would exclude the monopoly rent over the final
product.
Conclusion
Public utility commissions and courts in the United States are likely to pay
close attention to the Privy Council's decision in Telecom v. Clear because of
its thorough discussion of how the efficient component-pricing rule can be
applied to local telecommunications markets. The Maryland Public Service
Commission, for example, has been urged by Professor Kahn and Dr. Taylor,
in testimony on behalf of Bell Atlantic, to adopt their variant of the efficient
component-pricing rule, which they call the rule of "competitive parity," in
a pending proceeding involving entry by a competitive access provider. 3 For
the foreseeable future, the central controversy addressed in the appellate phase
of the New Zealand litigation-namely, the permissibility of allowing the
incumbent firm to recover monopoly rents in the opportunity-cost component
of its interconnection charge-will be a lesser concern in American regulatory
proceedings than it was in New Zealand simply because virtually all state and
federal regulatory jurisdictions in the United States currently regulate the prices
monopolists can charge for their end products. Thus, the efficient component-
pricing rule should be even more readily adopted in the United States than in
countries with New Zealand's form of "light-handed" regulation.
The Privy Council's decision will also elicit interest from other network
industries in which vertically integrated monopolists face the current or
imminent obligation to sell inputs to competitors. The electric power industry
is an obvious candidate for application of the efficient component-pricing rule.
The Energy Policy Act of 19922 amended section 211 of the Federal Power
Act (FPA)33 to empower the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to order
vertically integrated electric utilities to deliver competitively generated power
30. Id.
31. MFS Intelenet of Md., Inc., Case No. 8584, Order No. 71155, 152 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 102
(Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1994).
32. Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).
33. 16 U.S.C. § 824 er seq. (1985 & Supp. 1994).
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over their transmission lines.' Perhaps more important, the 1992 legislation
amended section 212 of the FPA to require that rates charged for mandatory
wholesale wheeling "shall promote the economically efficient transmission and
generation of electricity." 3' Those rates shall be high enough to "permit the
recovery by such utility of all the costs incurred in connection with the
transmission services and necessary associated services, including, but not
limited to, an appropriate share, if any, of legitimate, verifiable and economic
costs."36 As our derivation of the efficient component-pricing shows,
opportunity costs are indeed legitimate and verifiable and are economic costs
borne by the vertically integrated monopolist when selling its inputs to
competitors.
Finally, the Privy Council's discussion of the efficient component-pricing
rule will provide guidance to American courts considering antitrust cases in
which plaintiffs seek access to the essential facilities of vertically integrated
monopolists that are not formally regulated by any government agency. The
importance of such cases can be expected to grow as networks and information
services of all sorts become more prominent features of the American
economy.
34. Id. at § 824j(a) (Supp. 1994).
35. Id. § 824k(a) (Supp. 1994).
36. Id. (emphasis added).
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